SUMMARY: This paper reviews the approach to urban land management widely supported by international agencies, and its application in
I. URBAN MANAGEMENT a. Background to the Concept of Urban Management
URBAN MANAGEMENT AS a concept has its roots in local government reform and geographical concepts of "urban managerialism" in the 1970s (1) but it basically flourished as an institutionalized concept from the mid-1980s when it was championed by a number of key international donor agencies for the developing world. One of the lead agencies in this respect has been the World Bank, whose lessons from its urban investment projects of the early 1970s led it to wider systemic approaches in housing, urban land and infrastructure provision. (2) To this was added the need for institutional changes to allow for improved management of new urban investments, not least because of the lack of on-going maintenance. In addition, the sectoral "project" approach to development was increasingly seen as inherently limiting, leading to a stress by donors on the "programme approach" and policy development.
These factors were instrumental in leading the World Bank, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (UNCHS) to develop a joint Urban Management Programme (UMP) in the late 1980s. Key policy documents published at the time by these multilateral agencies, of relevance to their promotion of urban management, were: the Global Report on Human Settlements (3) which focused on the rapidly growing importance of urban settlements in demographic and economic terms; Urban Transition in Developing Countries: Policy Issues and Implications for Technical Cooperation in the 1990s (4) which took up this challenge and proposed coordinated inter-agency programmatic approaches to urban policy and management issues; and Urban Policy and Economic Development: An Agenda for the 1990s (5) which stressed the economic development potential of urban policy, and the obstacles to this.
b. The Urban Management Programme (UMP)
Negotiations for the UMP began in 1986, with a view to raising awareness of the implications of rapid urbanization and increasingly urbanbased economic growth in the developing world within the wider international community. (6) The programme was initially approved for 1986-91 and then for a further five years . It was funded predominantly by UNDP in Phase I, with other bilateral donors contributing increasing proportions in Phase II; a Phase III work programme was later developed. (7) Some 15 bilateral and multilateral agencies were involved in Phases I and II of the programme, involving a significant concentration of resources (the World Bank alone invested over US$ 1 billion between 1989-93). In addition, in the past decade, the UMP has been the basis for a considerable number of publications on urban management and has influenced multilateral aid in urban development, especially in sub-Saharan Africa.
Given its genesis, the programme has tended to be predominantly donor driven (8) although its overall impact on donor investment has been limited by the fact that many agencies had no urban policies and continued to avoid urban-based activities while others continued with their urban investment lending as before. In addition, each of the three main participating agencies (and divisions within them) have had different institutional aims and have continued independent operations in parallel, such as the Sustainable Cities Programme (UNCHS and UNEP), and the Municipal Development Programme (World Bank Economic Development Institute). This has led to significant differences in operation between the agencies and to regional variations in approach. (9) The need for a "broad church" approach to maximize the number of participating institutions led to the concept of urban management being defined mainly in operational ways. (10) Undoubtedly, this has been due also to the differing policy objectives and institutional processes/dynamics of the participating institutions, which have diversified in the programme's second phase. However, it is equally clear that it was influenced by changes in parallel policy agendas in development assistance. These changes included the promotion of sub-national level development as opposed to the large-scale national government dominated development strategies of the 1960s and 1970s; and the growing neo-liberal agenda in development of the early 1980s, which stressed reliance on markets and a slimmed down state facilitating and "managing" voluntary and private sector activities.
The urban management approach to date has stressed the following factors: 7. This was to focus on urban poverty alleviation, urban environmental management and participatory urban governance, and be developed through city consultations coordinated at UMP regional office levelsee http://www. unchs.org/unchs/english/ ump/3.htm.
8. Stren R (1993), "Urban management in development assistance", Cities Journal, May.
9. For instance, it can be argued that the UMP has been more demand-driven in Latin America as it supports more effective decentralization and local democratization processes there than in other regions, with a stronger emphasis on governance issues than the more "technical" q strengthening local government through supporting decentralization with the objective of moving decision-making on resource allocation closer to beneficiaries, and stressing their participation; q shifting from socially oriented concerns to economically oriented concerns -stimulating economic development, promoting efficiency and productivity, incorporating the informal sector, etc; q stressing the role of markets, yet accepting the role of the state as regulator, with promotion of partnerships; q coordination by a key strategic management team.
While many of these factors are politically sensitive and would entail a crucial role for local politics, in fact there has often been a lack of political analysis to identify different vested interests, to determine the influence these interests (formally and informally) have on decision-making in practice, and to assess who is excluded from these processes. (11) This potentially undermines many of the "technical" aims. It could also be argued that the various elements of the approach can be conflicting: such as stressing participation yet shifting from socially oriented reforms. Thus, elements of the approach are more directly tied to ideology than to practice.
c. Urban Management and Poverty
In the programme's second phase, increasing attention has been paid to urban poverty alleviation, linked with the second phase of structural adjustment (or "adjustment with a human face"). (12) Since 1994, the focus on poverty alleviation has added another layer to the number of publications and conferences sponsored under the UMP; however, to what extent it has led to practical improvements is not clear. The realms of action under this rubric include revision of municipal regulations to be more responsive to the needs of the poor; improvements in basic service delivery for the poor; stimulation of employment creation through, for instance, labour intensive public works; and targeting "safety net" assistance to the most vulnerable. (13) That some of these goals could potentially conflict with the overall thrust of reducing subsidy and improving urban productivity is not expressed.
In fact, the growth of urban-based poverty in the developing world is closely related to economic globalization factors and to weak governance systems which do not encourage wider distribution of wealth. Nevertheless, the recent neo-Keynesian trend in development policy promoted by the major donors continues to stress urban poverty alleviation through close public-private sector joint management, broadly continuing the urban management concept, with this being adapted as desired. There is thus an increasing need to examine the concept as applied in practice and not predominantly through its publication output. This will entail assessing the impact on urban areas of concurrent structural adjustment, while at the same time not treating social problems as inherent "natural consequences of growth". (14) d. Assessing the Urban Management Approach
The impact of the UMP has yet to be assessed; (15) however, the underlying policy assumptions and the predominance of policy statements as opposed to practical implementation have been queried. (16) Other critical issues raised include: q the actual interests and/or capacity of the private sector to respond to 13. See Rakodi, C (1995), "Poverty lines or household strategies? A review of conceptual issues in the new opportunities; q the capacity of the public sector to adequately manage the more complex tasks involved; q the actual responsibilities of the public sector where large proportions of the population lack access to adequate basic services which underpin public health; q the related problems of affordability for services; and q the generally weak governance systems in place. (17) To a great extent, the crucial question is whether urban management, as promoted widely by international agencies in the UMP, is a supply-led or demand-driven system. The political applicability of the approach is never examined in any depth in the official statements of donor activities (except as qualified "risks"). Thus, despite the claims by the programme managers that the second phase is demand-driven, it is quite likely to be perceived by local political actors as supply-led although they may be prepared to adopt aspects of the proposals where convenient, for example, in situations of emerging political pluralism where new local governments may need to act in opposition to central government.
Concerning ideology, however, potentially different development theories, policies and ideologies can find the broad sectoral, operational and procedural objectives acceptable. The close alliance between the concept and the dominant development theory of neo-liberalism, and its strategic implications concerning structural adjustment, has to a great extent been glossed over. In practice, the urban manager may not be so concerned with this although it will definitely constrain his/her field of operation. Hence, as urban management and poverty alleviation has been the main item on donors' urban agendas for over a decade, there is an increasing need to collect information on its actual impact as applied, often fairly loosely, in various ways in many places, and to begin to assess the realistic nature of the concept and approach vis-à-vis its predominant underpinning ideology. To this end, this paper looks at a case study of proposals to improve urban management in a World Bank assisted programme in Mozambique, one of the poorest countries in the world, and, specifically, at its potential impact on the urban poor and their access to land. (18) a. Poverty in Maputo MOZAMBIQUE HAS, FOR some time, been classified as one of the poorest countries in the world according to world development reports. While macro-economic stability has been established in recent years and there is recent evidence of the commencement of inward foreign direct investment and economic growth, structural adjustment (which began in 1987) has demonstrably improved the conditions for only a minority of urban residents while it has harshened the conditions for the majority. (19) This is possibly more so in Maputo, the capital, which, because of its size and location, does not allow the option many smaller urban areas have of widespread urban agriculture as an essential element in household survival strategies.
II. CASE STUDY IN MAPUTO
Schubert (20) indicates that, in 1995, some 70 per cent of the population of Greater Maputo (21) (then estimated at 1.3 million) was assessed as being Plan (1998-99) . This paper draws on this experience, citing documentary sources when generally poor, 50 per cent as being in absolute poverty and 70 per cent as being destitute. (22) In other words, some 85,000 households, or 650,000 people, were absolutely poor and therefore unable to save or invest, as satisfying immediate needs dominated their economic activity. The causes of this poverty in Maputo are mainly structural, (23) with a high proportion of dependents to potentially economically active household membersonly 30 per cent of population have employment and only 33 per cent are within employable age range. The fact that the actual unemployment rate is 6 per cent, with an estimated under-employment rate of 5 per cent for working men and 15 per cent for working women, demonstrates the lower importance of conjunctural poverty. The contextual causes affect all income ranges and include low wages across the board, with real incomes decreasing for the majority. Schubert estimated the relative proportions of the wider urban population affected by poverty as illustrated in Table 1 . While Table 1 illustrates the quantitative impact of poverty, the qualitative impact is more difficult to assess. Schubert pointed to the high proportion of female street traders (which represented 50 per cent of all economically active women). However, he also indicated a gender differential in informal sector income of 5:1 in favour of male operators. More recent research undertaken by de Vletter, (24) however, points to the changing gender structure of informal sector employment. Informal vending had expanded rapidly in recent years in parallel to, and in competition with, the expansion of formal commerce but, whereas initially most informal vending was by women, increasingly men are dominating non-food vending. De Vletter also found significant differences between informal and formal sector actors, the vast majority of the former being young (under 35 years) and reasonably well-educated (70 per cent having attained basic primary schooling to 4th class) whereas, in contrast, some two-thirds of formal sector workers were aged over 35 and had very basic schooling. This reflects the structural constraints on the expansion of formal employment.
Structural adjustment has led to a massive restructuring of the employment sector in Mozambique, entailing widespread losses in the formal sector. There are no accurate overall figures for this, but investigation undertaken in preparation for the new Metropolitan Area Structure Plan for Maputo indicates that losses in recent years total up to 20,000 jobs (in a formal sector workforce of some 160,000), including some 5,000 in the single largest employer (the Port and Rail Authority) and another 5,000 or so in the important cashew nut industry. New private investment has been coming into the country; however, this tends to be used to restructure the existing business sector, especially in transport, medium-scale industry and the service sector or in partnerships in the recently privatized businesses, many of which also are shedding their excess workforce. Overall, the structure plan estimated that some 60 per cent of the Greater Maputo workforce was engaged in the informal sector. The majority of activities are commercial and service provision, with a relative lack of small-scale producers. Some 80 per cent of activities and 66 per cent of informal employment are thus seen as economically marginal. (25) While macro-economic effects have to some extent been successful, the pay-off in terms of economic growth has not as yet created many new jobs. An example of this is a new aluminium smelter (MOZAL) being built with international investment just outside the city limits of Matola, Maputo's satellite city. While the project will create approximately 7,000 jobs during the construction phase, employment during the operational phase will only be approximately 700 jobs, one-third of which will be foreign, and will take two-thirds of the overall salary pool. The investment to permanent job ratio is therefore something like US$ 2.5 million per position.
Urban poverty reduction policies in Mozambique have concentrated mainly on the most vulnerable groups within society. Schubert outlines the various government programmes to assist these groups and the relative success of the poverty alleviation activities, focusing on the Gabinete de Apoio a Populaçao Vulneravel (GAPVU -Office for Support to Population at Risk) social safety net approach in targeting the destitute. Concerning conjunctural poverty, he notes that programmes to create employment and generate income had possibly created some 3,000-5,000 jobs in the 1991-95 period although this had been offset by net reductions in formal employment. He also notes the government's minimum wage scheme but accepts that this has not kept pace with costs and, hence, overall buying power has diminished.
De Vletter, (26) on the other hand, considers the safety net approach to be palliative rather than developmental, and potentially to create dependency. His focus is the conjuncturally un-and under-employed, that is, those who can benefit from increasing the quantity and/or quality of their labour power. He reviews a number of schemes to promote small enterprises (mostly commencing from the beginning of the structural adjustment programme in the late 1980s and mostly donor funded). His estimate is that maybe only 1,000 small entrepreneurs have benefited to date from these (predominantly credit-based) schemes, which have operated at highly subsidized interest rates and have also suffered poor loan repayment rates. In addition, the cumbersome channels through which the government has insisted they operate have made them inflexible and slow to respond. De Vletter points out that the alternative of employment creation through labour intensive public works has, as yet, been little developed in Mozambique despite the relative success of the Basic Urban Services project initiated by the World Food Programme in conjunction with the Mozambican Association for Urban Development. (27) The limitations on replicability of these schemes is, to some extent, due to their high organizational needs -at least initially. (28) The lack of any coordinated employment policy exacerbates the emerging urban employment crisis, characterized by high levels of redundancy 28. This is also largely true of the earlier attempts to create production cooperatives in the urban construction sector. Created in the early 1980s, and supported by the Maputo city council with limited international NGO support, these were generally taken over by the donor in larger companies and increasing proportions of the population marginalized in low-income informal sector vending. While structural poverty is serviced by safety net measures, conjunctural poverty is deepening in the urban areas, as the newly redundant workers have neither the replicable skills nor the capital to start up, or engage in, productive activities; hence they gravitate towards low-entry informal vending. This represents a serious loss of investment in human resources and will have knock-on social and economic effects in the years to come. The need for retraining as well as other forms of enterprise promotion is high -the new employers prefer the higher educated, who are in short supply -and yet any activities to date with donor or government involvement are ad hoc, such as the programme targeted at 4,000 demobilized soldiers (of a total of some 100,000). There is thus an extremely urgent need both to diversify the employment base and to improve the quantity and quality of the labour force, as current trends will soon create new structural constraints to growth.
b. The Impact of Poverty on Housing and Land Access
Household surveys in 1991/92 and 1996/97 in Maputo city (29) illustrate the impact of the high levels of structural, conjunctural and contextual poverty on the residents. Table 2 indicates average monthly household income and expenditure and the breakdown, with a focus on direct housing elements. A comparison of the two surveys indicates that overall average household income doubled from about US$ 60 to US$120 while expenditure more than doubled from about US$ 80 to US$ 200. (30) Also of note is the fact that the proportion of formal sector income fell and the importance of family agricultural production declined significantly, the slack being taken up by enterprise, mostly informal, especially for lowerincome groups. Rental income (mostly imputed rent) rose sharply in proportional and in dollar equivalent terms. Average household expenditure patterns remained dominated by food-related consumption, with small reductions in transport and clothing consumption. Expenditure on housing-related consumption also rose rapidly in proportional as well as in dollar equivalent terms, representing a proportional fall in value compared to imputed rental income. (31) The rise in actual housing expenditure is reflected in the sparse data available on land and housing costs. A recent estimate of land costs for housing in Maputo shows these vary generally between US$ 250-1,250 per plot, the median being less than US$ 500 for "normal" land and between US$10-50 per square metre for well-located land. Well-located land is accessed through the growing "illegal" high-cost land market, and generally results in formal title. "Normal" land, owing to constraints in supply, is accessed through the predominant, "informal" low-cost land market, and fails to result in formal ownership. (32) According to state suppliers of basically serviced residential land, (33) this costs between US$ 660-880 per plot. The cost of basic self-help construction was estimated at US$ 100-150 per square metre, with some 10 square metres per habitable room. A basic three-room house (with space for a family of five to sleep with a division of adults/children and sexes) would thus cost some US$ 3,675. Formal access to land and housing -of even a most basic standard -is thus far beyond the reach of the majority, without some form of state support.
In fact, there has been little state support for housing provision for the majority since Independence, except for programmes of residential land 31. These values are aggregated at city level and hence do not give any idea of the distribution of buying power. The breakdown of direct housing expenditure by quintile for Maputo city supply at local government level, which largely collapsed in the late 1980s during the time of structural adjustment. While these were later reactivated with central government support, their impact has been negligible. (34) Currently, the main state assistance to housing (in financial terms) is in the form of discounted divestiture of state rental units which funds a credit scheme operated by the state-funded, but formally autonomous, Housing Promotion Fund for new house construction. This is mainly targeted at lower-income state employees and offers subsidized interest rates of 10 per cent over 20 years to people earning the equivalent of three to eight minimum salaries. If the discounts were not so high and the funds generated were used to stimulate demand for land instead of housing, the impact of state support would be more effective. (35) The formal supply for lower-income groups is still substantially through national institutions such as the National Institute for Urbanism and Housing and the national Housing Promotion Fund, and is both inefficient and limited in scope, and uncoordinated with local government plans. The lack of funding for residential land development at local government level has led to this becoming dominated by supply for better-off groups -i.e., the minority. This takes place both through direct land development by the local authority and, increasingly, through allocation of land to developers. In recent years, more than 30 different land allocations have been made to developers (private individuals, firms and parastatals) for residential development of condominiums in Greater Maputo -some 300 hectares in all, mostly in very well-located areas. (36) In Maputo, ten of the allocations were to one firm, allegedly with high political connections. This land is destined for the upper section of the market. Here, the developers basically pocket the betterment value, as the form of title under the new land law remains usufruct (see below). There is virtually no return to the public pocket for the costs of land supply (planning, registry, etc.), let alone for any betterment, although individuals in the land allocation process probably benefit personally from "facilitating" requests. Basically, only the economic and/or political élite have access to land through this system, whether through individual or condominium allocations.
With more efficient land provision and a lowering of costs, a significant proportion of the city's residents would be able to pay for subsidized formal access. This, however, would be considerably limited by the available funds and costs of multiple small loans through the Housing Promotion Fund. These, however, could be administered more efficiently through decentralized specialized institutions and could be used to promote housing-related savings (such as through credit unions) and thus lever in other funds, including social security funds which are now starting up in Mozambique. Of crucial importance would be the use of state support to assist more formal land access for a wider group rather than the current tendency to highly subsidize a minority for house construction. Whether the political will exists for this or not is examined below.
The stark reality of the situation, without any effective state assistance either on the supply or demand side for the vast majority of low-income residents, underpins the actual access to land for housing. This is predominantly informal (75 per cent of access) (37) and, although payments are made, these do not represent the real cost of the land and services as estimated by the state, let alone those of the private sector. Instead, what is paid for is generally the right to be allocated land and hence the right to occupy -that is, predominantly use value. Only at the higher end of the market would there appear to be any strong perception of land ownership and exchange value. However, in this formally illegal land market, the state derives virtually no benefit, as land is allocated at negligible cost and there is no land taxation. In fact, the real costs for the illegal high-cost purchaser are more likely to be bribes, to achieve allocation through the labyrinthine administrative process. While there is ample scope for making state land supply more efficient and for lowering the costs of supply of basic services, as well as taxing land (especially higher use value land), the above costs are still based on nationalized land. The effect of privatizing this would be disastrous for the majority, yet this is one of the solutions promoted by the better-off and by representatives of donor agencies. (38) local governments since the early colonial period, when the actual areas of urban land register were established. In 1965, in the city of Lourenço Marques (later Maputo), some 88 per cent of land was in private hands and 75 per cent of this was in the hands of 11 large-scale landowners. (40) This adversely affected the beginnings of town planning, such as the 1952 and 1972 city master plans. Nevertheless, there was no clear legal basis created for urban planning, and development control was reliant on city bylaws passed in 1973. (41) At the time of Independence, the new state nationalized all land as well as rented and abandoned housing. The 1975 Constitution also indicated that access to land for residential and family agricultural use was to be free from any payment. This was reflected in the land law of 1979, which focused on rural and agricultural land as it was developed by the Ministry of Agriculture. The law was quite general and the regulations for its interpretation were only approved in 1987 -again exclusively by the Ministry of Agriculture -with no regulations for land management in urban areas despite proposals by the National Institute for Physical Planning. (42) As a result, despite various attempts by the newly created city executive councils to develop urban planning and effective urban land allocation mechanisms to guide development, the lack of a legal basis for planning and urban land regulation led to severe constraints on urban land management. (43) This situation was exacerbated by the lack of political interest in supporting a more effective urban land supply system; on the contrary, in many situations the lack of regulation led to abuse by those in authority. With low priority for state resources, urban administration in general was extremely poorly staffed, even in relation to the low human resource profile in Mozambique in general. The result of limited formal access to land in periods of rapid urban demographic growth (from inward migration and high natural growth rates) led to widespread informal occupation of land, mostly controlled at the lowest level of urban administration and with no overall planning or registry. Thus, despite sometimes quite innovative simplified processes for land supply developed by local government personnel, the tendency was for formal land management to be weakly based in legal terms, politically and personally manipulated by an élite (both individual and institutional), and resolved informally at local level where, however, it was also open to abuse due to the lack of regulation. (44) The nature of local government after Independence increased the subordination to central government established in the colonial period, with an even weaker fiscal base yet with considerably expanded areas of administration and burgeoning urban populations. Various attempts to address urban land issues were initiated in the late 1980s within central government, and these eventually received international agency support. This mainly came from UNDP-UNCHS in developing national housing policy and urban development programmes but also through an initial urban sector loan from the World Bank, the Urban Rehabilitation Project in Maputo and Beira, which had a variety of urban housing, infrastructure and services components, including sites and services layouts.
While the World Bank project (1988-95) had a fairly straightforward project-based approach (surprisingly as, at the time, the Urban Management Programme had started), the UNDP-UNCHS project focused on land issues as integral to national housing policy and, subsequently, on the preparation of a national urban development programme. This latter project was not, however, able to influence central government on this issue, and national housing policy became primarily focused on state housing divestiture and on opening up to the private market, in line with the new Constitution of 1990. This Constitution maintained the nationalization of land, due mainly to pressure from the rural peasant lobby. Thus, urban land management issues remained without legal clarification, as they still do at the time of writing (see below).
UNDP-UNCHS subsequently pulled out of activity in the urban sector in Mozambique despite some attempts to involve some of the cities in the Sustainable City Programme. (45) The World Bank, however, proposed a second urban sector loan although it insisted that the basis for its development was through the preparation of various urban management mechanisms. It thus turned its attention to supporting the local government reform programme initiated by central government in response to the new Constitution. As a vehicle for this, it proposed coordinated donor agency support to the Local Government Reform Programme (PROL).
Recent Developments
In accordance with the introduction of more democratic processes of government in the new Constitution, the government in the early 1990s embarked on a programme of local government reform known as Descentralização e Autonomia dos Orgãos Locais (Decentralization and Autonomy of Local Authorities). The objective of this programme is to promote financial and administrative decentralization and greater autonomy of action for local government (cities and districts), the powers and capacities of local authorities being strengthened so that they could respond more adequately to local needs and demands. By the late 1990s the future form, powers and functions of local government were more or less defined, with most local services -provided or controlled by central government -set to become the responsibility of local government. In this way, responsibility for physical and environmental planning, low-cost sanitation, waterborne sewerage and public health, among other services, was to pass exclusively to the local level. While initially, full autonomy for municipalization was envisaged, this required a constitutional amendment in 1997, as it was held to be in contradiction to the previous Constitution. After this change, local government was geographically restricted to urban areas (municipalities in cities, towns and village administrative posts). The elections finally took place in June 1998 in the first 33 cities and towns.
Within the donor funded PROL, the Ministry of State Administration (MAE) was responsible for overseeing the pilot experiences, responding and reporting to a special Commission of the Council of Ministers, which included the ministers for state administration, finance, construction and water affairs, justice, labour and the vice-minister for planning. A coordinating group was set up (46) as were three inter-sectoral working groups which were set up to guide the project activities. These working groups covered the areas of local government institutions, local government finances, and infrastructure, urbanization, housing, urban services and the environment.
During 1992-1994, the inter-sectoral working groups prepared projects for inclusion in an engineering credit to be granted by the World Bank as a precursor to a larger credit for a second urban project (Municipal Development Project), initially due to start in 1995 but which, at the time of writing, had been postponed until 2001. As far as urban development was concerned, the engineering credit was intended to support the first phase of the local government reform programme and a series of pilot urban and environmental management components. These included: q five structure plans (Pemba, Quelimane, Beira, Nampula and Metropolitan Maputo); q a pilot urban neighbourhood project in upgrading in Pemba; q a pilot environmental management project in Nampula; q promotion of non-motorized transport (bicycles) in Beira; q a pilot project in upgrading the land cadastre in Maputo city; q rapid digital mapping for the above five cities; q an addressage project in Maputo City. (47) The above were mainly implemented by international consultancy firms (selected through international tendering) in conjunction with the relevant local governments. (48) These pilot projects were supervised, on behalf of the World Bank and central government, by the inter-sectoral working group, as was the work of other consultants in the preparation of a series of laws, model bylaws and regulations for decentralization, and in the development of systems for financial management within local government.
The PROL project started in 1994 and ended in 1999, considerably behind schedule. It was severely affected by the limited administrative and technical capacity within Mozambique to implement a project of this nature and also by the slow process of political decentralization. Concerning the former, the proposed inter-ministerial commission to oversee the whole project never met, neither did the overall technical coordinating group. The sectoral working groups therefore tended to work in isolation, with only limited coordination through the national director of local administration in the Ministry for State Administration. In addition, there was a series of logistical difficulties with the international consultants, most of whom had severe difficulties operating in the extremely low resource environment in Mozambique, and there was very limited linkage between the various technical sub-components.
Concerning institutional capacity, this was traditionally weak in the urban sector due to post-Independence low prioritization for development strategies. This situation was compounded by ten years of structural adjustment during which the majority of better qualified personnel left the public sector. Hence, in most urban administrations there was not even the most basically qualified personnel. The situation in Maputo was a little better as the city administration had started to employ new graduates from the university; however, it had no economist and in the urban planning and land management sectors it had only a few young architects and medium-level planning technicians, the former having no significant training in urban land management or planning. Hence, although the terms of reference for the various pilot projects entailed capacity-building, in practice this was limited because basically trained personnel were not available and primary outputs vis-à-vis the terms of reference were difficult to produce.
Over and above the complexity of implementation, management and coordination in a project of this nature in Mozambique, the other main factor which impeded successful implementation was political. The decentralization process took much longer than originally planned, due in no small part to the concern of the ruling party that they might lose significant power at local level to opposition parties. This meant that the pilot urban development projects mostly started before new local govern- ments were in place. In the case of the Maputo structure plan, the first half of the ten-month project was implemented during the outgoing, nominated, local government's tenure, which was characterized by a certain amount of heightened illicit activity by officials expecting to lose power. There then ensued a "caretaker" period of a few months with no effective local counterpart, after which the project was completed while the newly elected councillors were "finding their feet". Effective participation of the local government was thus minimal, and that of the wider population even less, as the local government wanted to control closely any contact with the electorate.
d. The Relevance of UMP Proposals to Land Management in Maputo
While the UMP documents stress that each urban situation needs careful analysis, typical proposals for improved access to land under the programme include: q a clearer understanding of land market operations, both formal and informal; q appropriate and incremental land tenure systems (formal and informal); q improved cadastral and titling systems; q the development or improvement of land information systems; q innovative policies to increase the supply of serviced land (such as guided land development); q simplified spatial planning and land regulation procedures; and q simplified institutional and legal arrangements for land supply, survey, development and transfer. The above elements are to be analyzed and developed with a view to making land markets work effectively. This is to be achieved through identifying distortions (in policies and regulation); improving institutions and instruments to support effective land market operation (security of transactions, title and tenure; efficiency in costs and timelines); and improving governance (openness and transparency) in technical, administrative and political institutions.
In relation to Mozambique, while not being cited officially at any time as being part of the Urban Management Programme, most of the above elements were present in the various terms of reference for the urban development sub-components of the PROL programme. As has been seen above, there have been major difficulties with the implementation of the project which affect its impact -many of these being of a political and institutional nature.
For example, in the recent Maputo structure plan proposals, differentiated land taxes were proposed, with a tax based on the initial assessment of the "informal" land market and basically aimed at underpinning the administrative and physical process of land supply by the state (or subcontracted agents); and another tax based on the actual trends in the higher end of the land market, to capture a reasonable proportion of the added value for the state. Both proposed the continued zero land cost per se (i.e., nationalization), arguing that the public good would be best served by maintaining this, but that access should be taxed progressively for higher-income groups. The proposals were radical in that the Constitution, even as revised in 1990, does not allow for land taxation, as such, for residential use. The proposed taxes were thus seen as "urbanization taxes" related to the urban land supply process and, hence, legally feasi- ble. The proposals were couched conceptually, based on embryonic research into the emerging illegal -and consolidating informal -land markets, but stressed the need for more research into actual market activity and identification of strata within this.
While this research is still necessary, issues raised concerning the political acceptability of these proposals include the following: q the beneficiaries of the current situation are the politically powerful who are clearly benefiting from the cheap land access for personal use and speculation; q the potential beneficiaries at lower-income levels currently do not generally have formal access to land, nor expect this, and, as they consider themselves secure, do not as yet express a strong political position on residential land access; q the recently elected local government, while requiring local forms of taxation, still has to consolidate its position vis-à-vis central government transfers and rights to develop local taxes and would, in any case, have to kick-start the land supply process significantly to attract support from beneficiaries; q local government officials involved in land allocation would potentially lose significant income sources through dealing in land, as might local levels of administration at neighbourhood level (although, here, costs are much lower); q there has been no effective support from central government institutions involved in land issues for such land supply mechanisms and these institutions are currently in organizational disarray; and q most donor institutions in Mozambique have not paid any real attention to the urban land issue with the limited exception of some Scandinavian city-to-city cooperation. (49) It is argued that PROL did not deal effectively with any of the main elements of the overall project affecting the structure plan, and thus there is little likelihood of the plan being implemented. The main elements are:
Legal basis: The need for a clear legal basis for urban planning was not recognized in the initial design of the programme, although investigation of the legal basis for urban land management was an integral part of the Maputo land cadastre pilot project. (50) Despite the fact that some consultancy work on procedures and regulations for planning and management was included in 1996/97, it was only in early 1999, just prior to the end of the project, that a national legal consultant was sought to review the basis for planning law. (51) All in all, the main concerns for the legal aspects of the project focused almost exclusively on the decentralization process.
Financial basis: The work within the overall programme focused on the fiscal base for the new autonomous urban areas, with reference to national and local taxation, but did not allow the development of a wider view of finance for urban development. (52) Proposals for differentiated land taxation within the structure plan were not taken up by the relevant working group on local government finances.
Institutional basis: As noted above, the weak technical and administrative basis for the two municipalities is evident and the programme did little to alter this. In fact, it probably detracted from normal institutional capacity during its existence. The lack of institutional development within World Bank projects has been noted previously in Mozambique. (53) Political administrative basis: The structure plan area covered the two municipalities of Maputo and its satellite Matola, and areas between these and the two nearest towns in Maputo province to the north and south. It hence involved three administrations, namely, two autonomous municipalities, newly elected during the course of the project, and one appointed provincial government of long standing. While technical contacts were to a greater or lesser extent developed during the plan preparation process (depending on availability of personnel), the political coordination between the three administrations was complicated, more so due to the evolving decentralization process. Hence, while the structure plan proposal called for metropolitan functions to be developed for certain activities (e.g. land management and development, infrastructure planning and environmental protection), there was no way that this could be implemented for all three administrations, and only possibly for the two municipalities if they chose to form an association. In practice, it is quite likely that they will compete rather than collaborate.
Aspects of the UMP approach to the Mozambican situation are potentially relevant, but the limited analysis of the actual situation to datemainly in institutional and political terms, although also technicalrenders the impact of very limited value. The only parts of the PROL project to have had an identifiable wider impact to date have been the legal and financial instruments. These, however, have been narrowly focused on the fiscal basis of decentralization, neither (as yet) dealing with important aspects of urban productivity, and reproductivity, such as land issues. Why is this? Is it just a failing on the part of the World Bank in setting its terms of reference? Is it a failing on the part of the consultants to properly implement these, or of the government-based monitoring agencies to ensure that they are? Probably all of these have played a part; however, this paper argues that the main failing has been to face up to the realities of the situation in Maputo -political, institutional, economic and social.
III. CONCLUSION
The attempt to apply the urban management approach in Maputo through the Local Government Reform Programme (PROL) has not faced the reality of weak institutions, the changing socio-economic context nor the changing political scene. With respect to the first two aspects, the approach has not been adequate to confront the massive human resource implications of institutional capacity-building that the country requires and has seriously underestimated the tendency towards new levels of structurally induced poverty, with declining affordability. In addition, it has not faced the reality of the changing political scene, including the assumption that local government will mean better governance. Whilst evidence of this has yet to be gathered, it is worth noting the weak support for local government as expressed in the election turnout: less than 15 per cent of the electorate turned out nationwide and less than 10 per cent in Maputo. It has been argued that this reflects the extent to which civil society has lost trust in the electoral system and political representation, and in the state in general terms. (54) There is little faith that a new level of government will be able to represent wide social interests any better than previous more centralized forms. The fact that central government still takes major decisions affecting the city exacerbates this position. (55) With reference to ideology, it has been argued that the lack of definition of the "unanalyzed abstraction" of urban management was, to some extent, deliberate to form a wider consensus around how to "manage" urban areas under the predominant structural adjustment of the period. (56) This position is further developed by Jones and Ward (57) in one of the most comprehensive critiques of the UMP to date, which focused on the applicability of the programme's proposals for land management. This challenged what it called the simplistic and ambitious nature of the World Bank's approach, which it identified closely with the analysis and recommendations of the UMP, arguing that this basically continued the neoliberal agenda. (58) In support of this position, it has to be noted that, while elements of this "unanalyzed abstraction" are undoubtedly necessary to improve urban management in Maputo, the question of who might benefit -i.e., the objectives of improved urban management as opposed to its operational mechanisms -have been little discussed. The assumption that higher urban productivity would benefit all has yet to be proved. In fact, there is no evidence of political backing for this as yet from either the newly elected local governments, the dominant political élite at central government level or the new economic élite. The latter group is the most likely to support such changes; however, their interests will have little positive benefit for the urban poor as shown in the current trends in land access. Whether local government will have sufficient interest or power to support the social needs of the majority of its citizens, and whether the resulting responses are economically feasible in the wider context of economic restructuring, are both still major questions for the future.
Most of the critiques mentioned in Section I on the Urban Management Programme are valid when applied to the recent attempts to promote improved urban land management in Maputo. Most importantly, the possibility of applying UMP approaches in practice are seriously hampered by the extremes of urban poverty and fragility of urban governance. Poverty is directly associated with the on-going effects of structural adjustment and, arguably, will still worsen for many. The new governance regime is, as yet, unproven in practice. Urban governance is, in fact, the key issue, as it is potentially the basis for demand-driven, as opposed to supply-led, urban management. Although this term often suffers from as vague a definition as urban management does, good governance implies strong relationships between the governed and those who govern, which, in turn, requires institutional capacity both within government and civil society to permit wide demand management. (59) Whether this is possible has not been investigated effectively to date in situations such as Mozambique, where improving urban productivity and providing basic services to the urban poor majority who have limited capacity to invest in any formal system are in potential conflict. The fact that, in Mozambique, the informal system works relatively well is what has kept the country from more serious social crises. The threat is that a simplistic urban management approach focused on improving urban productivity will seriously undermine this. Urban management improvements have to be focused on social improvements as much as on economic ones, and the most important activity of donors would be to support the building of institutional capacity and to enhance governance to this end. 
